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Remove IP whitelist mechanism, keep only token authentication

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Co-authored-by: krau <71133316+krau@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
copilot-swe-agent[bot]
2026-01-19 05:42:14 +00:00
parent 20a5e317ae
commit 173a5e3733
6 changed files with 11 additions and 204 deletions
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61
api/middleware.go
View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package api
import (
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -10,7 +9,7 @@ import (
"github.com/krau/SaveAny-Bot/config"
)
// authMiddleware validates API token and IP restrictions
// authMiddleware validates API token
func authMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Skip auth for health check
@@ -21,15 +20,6 @@ func authMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
cfg := config.C()
// Check IP whitelist if configured
if len(cfg.API.TrustedIPs) > 0 {
clientIP := getClientIP(r)
if !isIPAllowed(clientIP, cfg.API.TrustedIPs) {
http.Error(w, `{"error":"forbidden: IP not allowed"}`, http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
}
// Check token if configured
if cfg.API.Token != "" {
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
@@ -74,52 +64,3 @@ func (rw *responseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
rw.statusCode = code
rw.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
}
// getClientIP extracts the real client IP from the request
func getClientIP(r *http.Request) string {
// Check X-Forwarded-For header
if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
ips := strings.Split(xff, ",")
if len(ips) > 0 {
return strings.TrimSpace(ips[0])
}
}
// Check X-Real-IP header
if xri := r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"); xri != "" {
return xri
}
// Fall back to RemoteAddr
ip, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
// If SplitHostPort fails, try to parse RemoteAddr as IP directly
if parsedIP := net.ParseIP(r.RemoteAddr); parsedIP != nil {
return r.RemoteAddr
}
// If all else fails, return empty string (will fail IP check)
return ""
}
return ip
}
// isIPAllowed checks if the client IP is in the allowed list
func isIPAllowed(clientIP string, allowedIPs []string) bool {
for _, allowedIP := range allowedIPs {
if clientIP == allowedIP || allowedIP == "*" {
return true
}
// Support CIDR notation
if strings.Contains(allowedIP, "/") {
_, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(allowedIP)
if err != nil {
continue
}
ip := net.ParseIP(clientIP)
if ip != nil && ipNet.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}

121
api/middleware_test.go
View File

@@ -6,68 +6,6 @@ import (
"testing"
)
func TestIsIPAllowed(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
clientIP string
allowedIPs []string
expected bool
}{
{
name: "exact match",
clientIP: "192.168.1.100",
allowedIPs: []string{"192.168.1.100"},
expected: true,
},
{
name: "no match",
clientIP: "192.168.1.100",
allowedIPs: []string{"192.168.1.101"},
expected: false,
},
{
name: "wildcard",
clientIP: "192.168.1.100",
allowedIPs: []string{"*"},
expected: true,
},
{
name: "CIDR match",
clientIP: "192.168.1.100",
allowedIPs: []string{"192.168.1.0/24"},
expected: true,
},
{
name: "CIDR no match",
clientIP: "192.168.2.100",
allowedIPs: []string{"192.168.1.0/24"},
expected: false,
},
{
name: "multiple IPs with match",
clientIP: "192.168.1.100",
allowedIPs: []string{"10.0.0.1", "192.168.1.100", "172.16.0.1"},
expected: true,
},
{
name: "localhost",
clientIP: "127.0.0.1",
allowedIPs: []string{"127.0.0.1"},
expected: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
result := isIPAllowed(tt.clientIP, tt.allowedIPs)
if result != tt.expected {
t.Errorf("isIPAllowed(%q, %v) = %v, want %v",
tt.clientIP, tt.allowedIPs, result, tt.expected)
}
})
}
}
func TestAuthMiddleware_NoAuth(t *testing.T) {
// Create a test handler
handler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -107,62 +45,3 @@ func TestAuthMiddleware_HealthCheck(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("Expected status 200 for health check, got %d", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestGetClientIP(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
xForwardedFor string
xRealIP string
expectedIP string
}{
{
name: "RemoteAddr only",
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.100:12345",
expectedIP: "192.168.1.100",
},
{
name: "X-Forwarded-For single",
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.100:12345",
xForwardedFor: "10.0.0.1",
expectedIP: "10.0.0.1",
},
{
name: "X-Forwarded-For multiple",
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.100:12345",
xForwardedFor: "10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2, 10.0.0.3",
expectedIP: "10.0.0.1",
},
{
name: "X-Real-IP",
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.100:12345",
xRealIP: "10.0.0.1",
expectedIP: "10.0.0.1",
},
{
name: "X-Forwarded-For takes precedence",
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.100:12345",
xForwardedFor: "10.0.0.1",
xRealIP: "10.0.0.2",
expectedIP: "10.0.0.1",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = tt.remoteAddr
if tt.xForwardedFor != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", tt.xForwardedFor)
}
if tt.xRealIP != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Real-IP", tt.xRealIP)
}
result := getClientIP(req)
if result != tt.expectedIP {
t.Errorf("getClientIP() = %q, want %q", result, tt.expectedIP)
}
})
}
}

2
config.example.toml
View File

@@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ port = 8080
token = ""
# 任务完成回调 Webhook URL (留空则不回调)
webhook_url = ""
# 可信任的 IP 地址列表 (留空则不限制), 支持单个 IP 或 CIDR 格式
# trusted_ips = ["127.0.0.1", "192.168.1.0/24"]
# 存储列表
[[storages]]

1
config/viper.go
View File

@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ type apiConfig struct {
Port int `toml:"port" mapstructure:"port" json:"port"`
Token string `toml:"token" mapstructure:"token" json:"token"`
WebhookURL string `toml:"webhook_url" mapstructure:"webhook_url" json:"webhook_url"`
TrustedIPs []string `toml:"trusted_ips" mapstructure:"trusted_ips" json:"trusted_ips"`
}
var cfg = &Config{}

11
docs/content/en/usage/api.md
View File

@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ port = 8080
token = "your-secret-token-here"
# Task completion callback webhook URL (leave empty to disable)
webhook_url = "https://your-server.com/webhook"
# Trusted IP addresses (leave empty to allow all), supports single IP or CIDR notation
trusted_ips = ["127.0.0.1", "192.168.1.0/24"]
```
## Authentication
@@ -33,8 +31,6 @@ If `token` is configured, all API requests (except `/health`) must include an `A
Authorization: Bearer your-secret-token-here
```
If `trusted_ips` is configured, requests will only be accepted from specified IP addresses.
## Endpoints
### Health Check
@@ -256,7 +252,6 @@ print(f"Task status: {status['status']}")
## Security Recommendations
1. **Always use a strong token** for production environments
2. **Enable IP whitelist** (`trusted_ips`) to restrict access
3. **Use HTTPS** in production by placing the API behind a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Caddy)
4. **Keep logs secure** as they may contain sensitive information
5. **Validate user permissions** - ensure `user_id` in requests corresponds to authorized users in your config
2. **Use HTTPS** in production by placing the API behind a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Caddy)
3. **Keep logs secure** as they may contain sensitive information
4. **Validate user permissions** - ensure `user_id` in requests corresponds to authorized users in your config

11
docs/content/zh/usage/api.md
View File

@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ port = 8080
token = "your-secret-token-here"
# 任务完成回调 Webhook URL (留空则不回调)
webhook_url = "https://your-server.com/webhook"
# 可信任的 IP 地址列表 (留空则不限制), 支持单个 IP 或 CIDR 格式
trusted_ips = ["127.0.0.1", "192.168.1.0/24"]
```
## 认证
@@ -33,8 +31,6 @@ trusted_ips = ["127.0.0.1", "192.168.1.0/24"]
Authorization: Bearer your-secret-token-here
```
如果配置了 `trusted_ips`，请求只会从指定的 IP 地址被接受。
## 端点
### 健康检查
@@ -256,7 +252,6 @@ print(f"任务状态: {status['status']}")
## 安全建议
1. **生产环境始终使用强令牌**
2. **启用 IP 白名单** (`trusted_ips`) 限制访问
3. **生产环境使用 HTTPS**，通过反向代理（如 Nginx、Caddy）放置 API
4. **保护日志安全**，因为它们可能包含敏感信息
5. **验证用户权限** - 确保请求中的 `user_id` 对应于配置中的授权用户
2. **生产环境使用 HTTPS**，通过反向代理（如 Nginx、Caddy）放置 API
3. **保护日志安全**，因为它们可能包含敏感信息
4. **验证用户权限** - 确保请求中的 `user_id` 对应于配置中的授权用户