fix: harden remote content policy edge cases (#1095)

* fix: harden remote content filtering edge cases

* fix: preserve safe escaped CSS

* test: cover unsafe navigation protocols

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 ### Bug Fixes
 
+- fix: |Frontend| 关闭邮件外部图片自动加载时保留 `<a>` 与 `<area>` 的外部导航链接，并阻断通过 CSS 转义函数名或 at-rule 绕过远程资源过滤的情况
 - fix: |Frontend| 使用共享 DOMPurify 净化逻辑处理关于页面与启动通知中的 HTML 公告，避免 `ANNOUNCEMENT` 中的可执行标签或事件属性造成 XSS
 - fix: |Worker| 按邮件认证规范修复垃圾邮件检测：SPF、DKIM、DMARC 的 `none` 及 SPF/DKIM `neutral` 按认证方法不存在处理，并忽略未注册结果和不支持的方法版本；`JUNK_MAIL_FORCE_PASS_LIST` 仍要求明确返回受支持的 `pass`
 - fix: |Admin| 管理后台删除邮箱地址时，先删除该地址的邮件、发件记录、自动回复等关联数据，最后再删除地址本身；此前地址行先被删除导致按地址名匹配的子查询查不到数据，邮件等记录被遗留在数据库中

CHANGELOG_EN.md

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 ### Bug Fixes
 
+- fix: |Frontend| Preserve external navigation links on `<a>` and `<area>` elements when automatic remote-image loading is disabled, and block remote CSS resources hidden behind escaped function or at-rule names
 - fix: |Frontend| Sanitize HTML announcements in both the About page and startup notification through a shared DOMPurify helper, preventing executable tags or event attributes in `ANNOUNCEMENT` from causing XSS
 - fix: |Worker| Align junk-mail checking with authentication standards: treat SPF, DKIM, and DMARC `none` plus SPF/DKIM `neutral` as absent, and ignore unregistered results and unsupported method versions; `JUNK_MAIL_FORCE_PASS_LIST` still requires an explicit supported `pass`
 - fix: |Admin| When deleting an address from the admin panel, delete its mails, sender records, sendbox and auto-reply entries before removing the address row itself; previously the address row was deleted first, so the name-based subqueries matched nothing and the mails were left orphaned in the database

frontend/src/utils/__tests__/remote-content-policy.test.js

@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ const V = [
     ['style 誘餌 url(', `<style>.a{content:"url(";background:url(${T})}</style>`],
     ['attr image-set', `<div style="background:image-set('${T}' 1x)">x</div>`],
     ['attr CSS 跳脫', `<div style="background:url(\\68 ttps://tracker.example/p.png)">x</div>`],
+    ['attr CSS 函式名稱跳脫', `<div style="background:u\\72l(${T})">x</div>`],
+    ['style CSS 函式名稱跳脫', `<style>.a{background:u\\72l(${T})}</style>`],
+    ['style CSS at-rule 跳脫', `<style>@im\\70ort "${T}";</style>`],
     ['URL 反斜線', `<img src="https:\\\\tracker.example\\p.png">`],
     ['scheme 無斜線', `<img src="https:tracker.example/p.png">`],
     ['data:text/html iframe', `<iframe src="data:text/html,&lt;img src=${T}&gt;"></iframe>`],
@@ -63,6 +66,8 @@ const KEEP = [
     ['排版 CSS', '<table><tr><td style="padding:8px;color:#333">hi</td></tr></table>', 'padding:8px'],
     ['style 區塊排版', '<style>.a{color:red;font-size:14px}</style><p class="a">x</p>', 'font-size:14px'],
     ['data: 於 CSS', '<div style="background:url()">x</div>', 'data:image/gif'],
+    ['外部 a 連結', `<a href="${T}">open</a>`, T],
+    ['外部 area 連結', `<map name="m"><area href="${T}" coords="0,0,1,1"></map>`, T],
 ];
 
 describe('攻擊向量', () => {
@@ -78,4 +83,39 @@ describe('必須保留', () => {
         expect({ v: n, kept: r.html.includes(needle), blocked: r.blocked })
             .toEqual({ v: n, kept: true, blocked: 0 });
     });
+
+    it('保留安全 CSS 跳脫與本地資源', () => {
+        const r = blockRemoteContent(
+            '<div style="font-family:\\41 rial;background:url()">x</div>'
+        );
+        expect(r.blocked).toBe(0);
+        expect(r.html).toContain('font-family:\\41 rial');
+        expect(r.html).toContain('data:image/gif');
+    });
+});
+
+describe('阻斷計數', () => {
+    it('逐一計算 CSS 跳脫函式中的遠端資源', () => {
+        const r = blockRemoteContent(
+            '<div style="color:red;background:u\\72l(https://a.example/a.png),u\\72l(https://b.example/b.png)">x</div>'
+        );
+        expect(r.blocked).toBe(2);
+        expect(r.html).toContain('color:red');
+        expect(r.html).not.toContain('https://');
+    });
+});
+
+describe('危險導航協議', () => {
+    it.each([
+        ['a javascript', '<a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a>', 'a'],
+        ['a data:text/html', '<a href="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>">x</a>', 'a'],
+        ['area javascript', '<map><area href="javascript:alert(1)"></map>', 'area'],
+        ['area data:text/html', '<map><area href="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>"></map>', 'area'],
+    ])('%s', (_name, html, selector) => {
+        const host = document.createElement('div');
+        host.innerHTML = blockRemoteContent(html).html;
+        const node = host.querySelector(selector);
+        expect(node).not.toBeNull();
+        expect(node.hasAttribute('href')).toBe(false);
+    });
 });

frontend/src/utils/remote-content-policy.js

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ const URL_ATTRIBUTES = new Set([
     'src', 'srcset', 'imagesrcset', 'href', 'xlink:href',
     'poster', 'background', 'data', 'action', 'formaction',
 ]);
+const NAVIGATION_HREF_ELEMENTS = new Set(['A', 'AREA']);
 
 // Elements that fetch on their own, redirect the frame, or re-base every
 // relative URL in the document. None of them belong in a mail body, and
@@ -29,6 +30,37 @@ const ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP =
 const CSS_FETCHES = /url\(|image-set|image\(|cross-fade|element\(|@import/i;
 // A url(...) token or a bare string, either of which can name a resource.
 const CSS_TOKEN = /url\(\s*(['"]?)([^'")]*)\1\s*\)|(['"])([^'"]*)\3/g;
+const CSS_ESCAPE = /\\([0-9a-f]{1,6})[ \t\r\n\f]?|\\([^\r\n\f0-9a-f])/gi;
+const CSS_ESCAPED_IDENTIFIER =
+    /@?(?:[-_a-z0-9]|\\(?:[0-9a-f]{1,6}[ \t\r\n\f]?|[^\r\n\f0-9a-f]))+/gi;
+const CSS_FETCH_IDENTIFIERS = new Set([
+    'url', 'image-set', '-webkit-image-set', 'image', 'cross-fade',
+    '-webkit-cross-fade', 'element', '-moz-element', '@import',
+]);
+
+function decodeCssEscapes(value) {
+    return value.replace(CSS_ESCAPE, (_match, hex, escaped) => {
+        if (!hex) {
+            return escaped;
+        }
+        const codePoint = Number.parseInt(hex, 16);
+        if (codePoint === 0 || codePoint > 0x10FFFF ||
+            (codePoint >= 0xD800 && codePoint <= 0xDFFF)) {
+            return '\uFFFD';
+        }
+        return String.fromCodePoint(codePoint);
+    });
+}
+
+function normalizeCssFetchIdentifiers(value) {
+    return value.replace(CSS_ESCAPED_IDENTIFIER, (identifier) => {
+        if (!identifier.includes('\\')) {
+            return identifier;
+        }
+        const decoded = decodeCssEscapes(identifier);
+        return CSS_FETCH_IDENTIFIERS.has(decoded.toLowerCase()) ? decoded : identifier;
+    });
+}
 
 /**
  * Whether a URL can be *proven* to stay off the network.
@@ -74,10 +106,11 @@ function srcsetIsLocal(value) {
  * dropped, so the surrounding rule structure survives.
  */
 function blockCssUrls(cssText, onBlocked) {
-    if (!CSS_FETCHES.test(cssText)) {
+    const normalizedCssText = normalizeCssFetchIdentifiers(cssText);
+    if (!CSS_FETCHES.test(normalizedCssText)) {
         return cssText;
     }
-    return cssText.replace(CSS_TOKEN, (match, urlQuote, urlValue, strQuote, strValue) => {
+    return normalizedCssText.replace(CSS_TOKEN, (match, urlQuote, urlValue, strQuote, strValue) => {
         const isUrlToken = urlValue !== undefined;
         const token = isUrlToken ? urlValue : strValue;
         if (provablyLocal(token)) {
@@ -108,6 +141,9 @@ function getPurifier() {
         if (!URL_ATTRIBUTES.has(data.attrName)) {
             return;
         }
+        if (data.attrName === 'href' && NAVIGATION_HREF_ELEMENTS.has(node.tagName)) {
+            return;
+        }
         const isSrcset = data.attrName === 'srcset' || data.attrName === 'imagesrcset';
         if (isSrcset ? srcsetIsLocal(data.attrValue) : provablyLocal(data.attrValue)) {
             return;